Minnesota Journal of Law & Inequality
Volume 36

Issue 1

Article 6

January 2018

Gutting the Fourth Amendment: Judicial Complicity in Racial
Profiling and the Real-Life Implications
Mary N. Beall

Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, and the Law Enforcement and Corrections
Commons

Follow this and additional works at: https://lawandinequality.org/
Recommended Citation
Mary N. Beall, Gutting the Fourth Amendment: Judicial Complicity in Racial Profiling and the Real-Life
Implications, 36(1) LAW & INEQ. (2018).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/lawineq/vol36/iss1/6

Minnesota Journal of Law & Inequality is published by the
University of Minnesota Libraries Publishing.

145

Gutting the Fourth Amendment: Judicial
Complicity in Racial Profiling and the
Real-Life Implications
Mary N. Beall†
Introduction
Thirteen years, eleven months, twenty-two days, and
approximately forty-six police stops filled the time between
Philando Castile’s first and final traffic stop.1 The majority of Mr.
Castile’s interactions with Minnesota’s law enforcement officers
were initiated pursuant to minor traffic infractions and only six stop
records detailed traffic violations that the stopping officer could
have been aware of from outside the car, such as speeding, blocking
an intersection, or improperly displaying his license plate.2 On July
6, 2016, Officer Jeronimo Yanez reported to dispatch that he was
pulling over Mr. Castile’s vehicle because the occupants “just look
like the people that were involved in a robbery . . . . [T]he driver
looks more like one of our suspects just because of the wide set [sic]
nose.”3 After being pulled over, Mr. Castile and Officer Yanez
exchanged greetings, and Officer Yanez requested Mr. Castile’s
driver’s license and proof of insurance.4 Shortly after handing
† J.D. Candidate, University of Minnesota Law School, 2018; B.A., Carroll
College, 2010. The author expresses her appreciation to Professor JaneAnne Murray
for her steady guidance and to the staff and editors of the Journal of Law &
Inequality: A Journal of Theory and Practice for their assistance in preparing this
Article for publication. The author would also like to thank her parents, Sally and
Ed, and sisters, Erin, Becky, and Katie, for their constant support, encouragement,
and the unique insights they so willingly share.
1. Eyder Peralta & Cheryl Corley, The Driving Life and Death of Philando
Castile, NPR (July 15, 2016, 4:51 AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/
2016/07/15/485835272/the-driving-life-and-death-of-philando-castile.
2. Id.
3. Felony Criminal Complaint at 3, Minnesota v. Yanez, (Minn. Dist. Ct. 2016)
(No. 62-CR-16-8110), 2016 WL 6800872; Riham Feshir, At Castile Stop, Uneasy
Questions of Race and Police Training, MINN. PUB. RADIO NEWS (July 14, 2016),
http://www.mprnews.org/story/2016/07/14/philando-castile-shooting-race-policetraining. As of January 2017, no individuals have been arrested or charged with the
July 2, 2016 robbery Officer Yanez referenced when pulling over Mr. Castile. Tad
Vezner, Robbery Investigation Mentioned in Philando Castile Stop Remains Open,
TWIN CITIES PIONEER PRESS (Oct. 2, 2016, 11:05 AM), http://www.twincities.com/
2016/10/01/robbery-investigation-mentioned-in-philando-castile-stop-remainsopen/.
4. Felony Criminal Complaint, supra note 3.
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Officer Yanez his insurance card, Mr. Castile told Officer Yanez,
“Sir, I have to tell you that I do have a firearm on me.”5
Approximately eight seconds later, Officer Yanez fired seven rounds
into the vehicle occupied by Mr. Castile, his girlfriend, and her
young daughter.6 Mr. Castile was fatally wounded.7
On November 16, 2016, Ramsey County Attorney John Choi
announced that his office had filed one charge of second degree
manslaughter and two counts of felony intentional discharge of a
dangerous weapon against Officer Yanez.8 Prosecutors alleged
that, “[n]o reasonable officer—knowing, seeing and hearing what
Officer Yanez did at the time—would have used deadly force under
these circumstances.”9 Nevertheless, on June 16, 2017, a jury
acquitted Officer Yanez of all charges.10 Mr. Castile’s story is not
unique.11 The series of events—from Officer Yanez’s decision to pull
Mr. Castile over, to the ensuing escalation that culminated in Mr.
Castile’s death, and finally, the jury’s acquittal—are not unusual,
especially among Blacks, Hispanics, and other racial minorities.12
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Christina Capecchi & Mitch Smith, Officer Who Shot Philando Castile Is
Charged with Manslaughter, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 16, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/
2016/11/17/us/philando-castile-shooting-minnesota.html?_r=0.
8. See id. (outlining the events leading up to the shooting of Mr. Castile and Mr.
Choi’s decision to file charges); see also Jon Collins, Riham Feshir & Tim Nelson,
Officer Charged in Castile Shooting, MINN. PUB. RADIO NEWS (Nov. 16, 2016),
https://www.mprnews.org/story/2016/11/16/officer-charged-in-castile-shooting
(“I
know my decision will be difficult for some in our community to accept, but in order
to achieve justice we must be willing to do the right thing no matter how hard it may
seem.”).
9. Capecchi & Smith, supra note 7.
10. Mitch Smith, Minnesota Officer Acquitted in Killing of Philando Castile, N.Y.
TIMES (June 16, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/16/us/police-shootingtrial-philando-castile.html?_r=0.
11. See Jana Kooren, The Minneapolis Police Department Is Finally Sharing
Data on Police Stops. Other Departments Should Follow., ACLU: SPEAK FREELY
(Sept. 12, 2017, 4:45 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/criminal-law-reform/reformingpolice-practices/minneapolis-police-department-finally-sharing (explaining that the
Minneapolis Police Department’s new data system provides the public with
information on traffic stops; the data shows that “Black people make up around 36
percent of people stopped but are only 18 percent of the population, while Native
Americans are 4 percent of the stops but only account for 2 percent of the population.
The disparities could be even greater because race was marked unknown for 24.4
percent of the people stopped.”); see also Madison Park, Police Shootings: Trials,
Convictions Are Rare for Officers, CNN (June 24, 2017, 8:18 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2017/05/18/us/police-involved-shooting-cases/index.html
(listing the names and stories of victims of police shootings and noting that officers
who killed the following individuals were either acquitted or charges were dropped:
Lamar Anthony Smith, Sylville Smith, Philando Castile, Terence Crutcher, and
Freddie Gray).
12. See Roland G. Fryer, Jr., An Empirical Analysis of Racial Differences in
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Despite widespread awareness of blatant police brutality and
lethality,13 the Supreme Court’s recent ruling in Utah v. Strieff
effectually undercuts the legal protections available to racial
minorities who experience unconstitutional and discriminatory law
enforcement actions.14 This Note will argue that Strieff and its
antecedents—Whren, Devenpeck, and Herring—cumulatively
authorize state-sponsored racial profiling and will amplify low-level
harassment of racial minorities by law enforcement officers,
resulting in an increase in instances of non-lethal and lethal use of
force against racial minorities.
Part I of this Note examines the integration of racial profiling
into law enforcement practice nationwide and surveys the legal
mechanisms intended to protect individuals from such actions. Part
II discusses the compounding effects of four United States Supreme
Court decisions, Whren, Devenpeck, Herring, and Strieff, that
narrow individuals’ Fourth Amendment rights. Part III analyzes
the impact of the Supreme Court’s construction of Fourth
Amendment protections by mapping the holdings of Strieff and its
antecedents onto data exposing the prevalence of racial profiling.
Finally, Part IV argues that Strieff and its antecedents incentivize
the practice of racial profiling and urges the adoption of a two-prong
approach to combat these dangerous policies: First, the Supreme
Court must acknowledge the role its decisions play in advancing
racial profiling and police brutality and halt the progression of its
precedent by endorsing Justice Sotomayor’s dissent in Strieff.
Second, law enforcement precincts must adopt recruitment and
training requirements that counter racial profiling.
Police Use of Force 3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 22399,
2016).
13. See Reg Chapman, ‘No Faith in This System’: Activists React to Philando
Castile Squad Car Video, CBS MINN. (June 20, 2017, 6:39 PM), http://minnesota.cbs
local.com/2017/06/20/community-reaction-castile-video/ (quoting local activist and
attorney Nekima Levy-Pounds, “Thinking about a situation in which he [referring to
her son] could be pulled over like that—shot and killed—and the officer simply being
able to say, ‘I was afraid for my life,’ being used as a justification under the law—it
boils my blood.”); see also About the Black Lives Matter Network, BLACK LIVES
MATTER, http://blacklivesmatter.com/about/ (last visited Nov. 29, 2017) (“We are
working for a world where Black lives are no longer systematically targeted for
demise.”).
14. Compare Utah v. Strieff, 36 S. Ct. 2056 (2016) (holding that evidence
discovered pursuant to an unlawful stop is admissible if an officer discovers an active
warrant after the illegal arrest), with Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146 (2004)
(holding that an officer’s subjective reason for initiating a stop need not be closely
related to the offense upon which the arrest is ultimately made), and Whren v.
United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996) (holding that pretextual stops are not
unconstitutional because courts do not look at the subjective intent of law
enforcement officers).
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Background
a. Empirical Evidence of Racial Profiling in Law
Enforcement Practice

In the United States, approximately 42% of face-to-face
interactions between individuals and law enforcement officers
originate from suspected traffic violations.15 In 2011, 13% of Black
drivers, 10% of White drivers, and 10% of Hispanic drivers were
pulled over.16 Of all drivers stopped by the police, Black drivers
were more likely to be ticketed than either White or Hispanic
drivers even though White drivers comprised a larger percentage of
total drivers.17 A recent examination of law enforcement data on
traffic stops and tickets in Cleveland found that Black drivers
comprised 38.4% of the driving population and yet they received
59% of all tickets; in contrast, White drivers comprised 54.6% of
drivers but received 33% of all tickets.18 The research evidences
that Black drivers are 2.5 times more likely to receive a ticket than
White drivers.19 Other racial minorities are 1.8 times as likely to
receive a ticket than White drivers.20
Racial disparities permeate deeper than disproportionate
stops and tickets. To initiate a search of a vehicle, law enforcement
officers must either have a warrant, be granted consent by the
individual being searched, or conduct a search incident to an
arrest.21 Across the United States, 3% of all drivers stopped by
police were subjected to a search; broken down by race, 2% of all
White drivers were searched by police compared to 6% of Black
drivers and 7% of Hispanic drivers.22 Despite searching Black and
Hispanic drivers far more frequently than White drivers, law
enforcement officers’ searches of Black and Hispanic drivers were

15. LYNN LANGTON & MATTHEW DUROSE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, POLICE
BEHAVIOR DURING TRAFFIC AND STREET STOPS, 2011 at 3 (Sept. 2013).
16. See id. at 1 (noting that Langton & Durose use “Latino” and “Hispanic”
interchangeably).
17. Id. at 7 (noting that 7% of Black drivers and 6% of Hispanic drivers were
ticketed, whereas 5% of White drivers were ticketed).
18. Ronnie A. Dunn, Racial Profiling: A Persistent Civil Rights Challenge Even
in the Twenty-First Century, 66 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 957, 974 (2016).
19. Id. at 973.
20. Id.
21. See 5 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 5.2(b), 131–37 (5th ed. 2012);
Seth W. Stoughton, Modern Police Practices: Arizona v. Gant’s Illusory Restriction of
Vehicle Searches Incident to Arrest, 97 VA. L. REV. 1727, 1727 (2010).
22. LANGTON & DUROSE, supra note 15, at 9.
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not found to have resulted in the discovery of higher rates of
contraband possession.23
The justification upon which law enforcement officers initiate
a stop and search of minority drivers often differs from that used to
support a stop and search of White drivers.24 The authors of a study
“of 4.5 million traffic stops conducted by the 100 largest police
departments in North Carolina”25 submit that Hispanic and Black
drivers “face discrimination in search decisions.”26
Law
enforcement officers’ disproportionate stopping and searching of
Hispanic and Black drivers creates a cycle of self-fulfilling
prophecies: multiple studies indicate that Black and Hispanic
drivers are surveilled, stopped, and ticketed more frequently than
White drivers.27 Cumulatively, these practices rewrite crime
narratives and lead “many officers [to] believe that querying
vehicles with African Americans produces more ‘hits.’”28 This
results in an abundance of adverse consequences for Black and
Hispanic drivers, including the disproportionate revocation of
driver’s licenses which leads to skewed arrest rates.29 These
findings expose the widespread and systematic integration of racial
profiling into law enforcement tactics throughout the nation.
23. Camelia Simoiu, Sam Corbett-Davies & Sharad Goel, The Problem of InfraMarginality in Outcome Tests for Discrimination, 11 THE ANNALS OF APPLIED
STATISTICS 1193, 1203 (2017) (finding in an empirical study of traffic stops in North
Carolina that the rate of contraband possession pursuant to a search is 32% for
Whites, 29% for Blacks, and 19% for Hispanics).
24. See id. at 1202–06 (“In nearly all the departments we consider, the inferred
search thresholds for [B]lack and Hispanic drivers are lower than for [W]hites,
suggestive of discrimination against these groups.”).
25. Id. at 1194.
26. Id. at 1194, 1213.
27. See Dunn, supra note 18, at 991; Timothy Bates, Driving While Black in
Suburban Detroit, 7 DU BOIS R. 133, 138 (2010) (indicating that in suburban Detroit,
Black drivers were disproportionately ticketed compared to White drivers and were
more likely than White drivers to receive multiple tickets); Albert J. Meehan &
Michael C. Ponder, Race and Place: The Ecology of Racial Profiling African American
Motorists, 19 JUST. Q. 399, 422 (2006) (“Profiling, as measured by the proactive
surveillance of African American drivers, significantly increases as African
Americans travel farther from ‘[B]lack’ communities and into whiter
neighborhoods.”).
28. Meehan & Ponder, supra note 27, at 418 (2006) (emphasis in original); see
License
Suspensions
&
Revocations,
DEP’T. OF
MOTOR VEHICLES,
http://www.dmvnv.com/dlsuspension.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2017) (noting that a
finding of failure to pay child support, a conviction of graffiti violation, or underage
purchase, drinking, or possession of alcohol results in either a driver’s license
revocation or suspension).
29. See Dunn, supra note 18, at 979 (“In that [B]lacks were the overwhelming
majority of those cited for ‘driving under suspension or revocation’ (seventy-nine
percent), they were likewise the majority of those arrested. . . . [B]lacks were
arrested at 1.86 times their percentage of all motorists.”).
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Racial profiling refers to the use of an individual’s race or
ethnicity as a “proxy for suspicion of involvement in some form of
criminal activity or threat.”30 Proving the use of racial profiling as
an illegal practice is an extremely difficult task that requires
demonstrable proof that an officer acted with discriminatory
intent.31 To challenge racial profiling under the Equal Protection
Clause, an individual must prove both discriminatory intent and
discriminatory effect.32 One particularly salient and culturallyrelevant example of racial profiling, “driving while black or brown,”
refers to a common law-enforcement practice where police routinely
stop Black and Hispanic drivers, based on the color of their skin,
with the assumption that the driver is breaking a non-moving
traffic regulation, such as not wearing a seatbelt, or is in possession
of illicit materials.33 Any traffic violation discovered after an
allegedly pretextual stop, regardless of gravity, establishes
sufficient probable cause to validate the stop, even if the initial
basis for the stop lacked the requisite probable cause.34 This is
disturbing given the near impossibility of an officer knowing prior
to a stop that an individual is not wearing a seatbelt, lacks car
insurance, or has an invalid driver’s license, raising the question as
to what valid probable cause warranted the stop.35
The Cleveland study found that Black drivers received 83% of
all citations for seatbelt violations and 88% of all citations for

30. Dunn, supra note 18, at 961.
31. Meehan & Ponder, supra note 27, at 403; see, e.g., United States v. Davis, 11
F. App’x 16 (2d Cir. 2001) (unpublished) (holding that the defendant did not prove
that he was subjected to intentional racial profiling, noting that the government
provided evidence stating that 6.1% of the driving citations given by the particular
officer in a three-year period were issued to Blacks and that the defendant was the
only individual cited for the failure to display a registration sticker); Lee v. City of
South Charleston, 668 F. Supp. 2d 763 (S.D. W. Va. 2009) (noting that despite
providing evidence of the disparate treatment of minority drivers throughout the
state, cities, and counties, the study provided by the defendant did not provide
evidence of racial profiling for the specific city where the defendant was pulled over).
32. See Kimberly J. Winbush, Racial Profiling by Law Enforcement Officers in
Connection with Traffic Stops as Infringement of Federal Constitutional Rights or
Federal Civil Rights Statutes, 91 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 1, 3.
33. DAVID A. HARRIS, ACLU, DRIVING WHILE BLACK: RACIAL PROFILING ON OUR
NATION’S HIGHWAYS (June 1999), https://www.aclu.org/report/driving-while-blackracial-profiling-our-nations-highways.
34. Thomas Fusco, Permissibility Under Fourth Amendment of Detention of
Motorist by Police, Following Lawful Stop for Traffic Offense, to Investigate Matters
Not Related to Offense, 118 A.L.R. Fed. 567.
35. See Dunn, supra note 18, at 987, 989 (noting that not wearing a seatbelt and
driving after suspension constitute traffic violations that are not readily observable
by law enforcement officers).
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driver’s license offenses;36 another study of a medium-sized
suburban city evidenced that as Black drivers entered
predominantly White communities, the likelihood of law
enforcement conducting a “rolling check” skyrocketed.37 Law
enforcement officers conduct a “rolling check” by contacting
dispatch, who will run a vehicle’s information and the social
security number that corresponds with the license plate.38 In the
wealthiest neighborhoods of Cleveland, Black drivers are subjected
to “rolling checks” at rates that are between 325% and 383% higher
than their representation in the driving population.39 Law
enforcement officers’ belief that “rolling checks” of Black and
Hispanic drivers will unearth more traffic violations than “rolling
checks” of Whites implicitly motivates officers to target Blacks and
Hispanics, causing racial biases to guide police practice.40
Evidence of improper motivation within police departments
can also be found within the Department of Justice’s (DOJ)
investigation into Ferguson, Missouri’s law enforcement and
judicial practices.41 The investigation, initiated after the fatal
shooting of Michael Brown, found that revenue generation, rather
than concern for public safety, structured Ferguson’s law
enforcement practices.42 The DOJ found that in 2013, the Ferguson
municipal court issued more than 9,000 arrest warrants, largely for
low-level offenses such as parking violations, traffic infractions, and
housing code violations.43 Within Ferguson, Black defendants were
50% more likely to have an arrest warrant issued than Whites, and
Blacks accounted for a stunning 92% of all arrest warrants issued,
despite comprising only 67% of the population in Ferguson.44 The
DOJ also found that during a six-month period, of those brought to
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id. at 982.
Meehan & Ponder, supra note 27, at 417.
Dunn, supra note 18, at 988.
Meehan & Ponder, supra note 27, at 417.
Id.
See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. C.R. DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE
FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT (March 4, 2015) https://www.justice.gov/sites/
default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_
department_report.pdf (investigating the unlawful practices and conduct in the
Ferguson Police Department) [hereinafter FERGUSON INVESTIGATION].
42. Id. at 2.
43. See id. at 3 (“Jail time would be considered far too harsh a penalty for the
great majority of these code violations, yet Ferguson’s municipal court routinely
issues warrants for people to be arrested and incarcerated for failing to timely pay
related fines and fees.”). Apart from the legal consequences that Blacks and
Hispanics face due to practices of racial profiling, these drivers also experience the
use of non-lethal force at higher rates. Fryer, Jr., supra note 12, at 47 tbl.2A.
44. FERGUSON INVESTIGATION, supra note 41, at 6.
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jail due only to an outstanding warrant, 96% were Black.45
Similarly, during a two-year period, the Ferguson Police
Department arrested 460 individuals during traffic stops due only
to outstanding arrest warrants; of those arrested, 96% were Black.46
The racial disparities in warrant issuance creates further
challenges for minorities because “violations that would normally
not result in a penalty of imprisonment can, and frequently do, lead
to municipal warrants, arrests, and jail time.”47
Increased latitude to target racial minorities can turn lethal
when combined with law enforcement officers’ proclivity for unsafe
and escalated use-of-force tactics. A recent DOJ investigation into
the City of Chicago’s Police Department (CPD) examined whether
the department employed unlawful policies and practices.48 After
interviewing hundreds of CPD staff, community organizations, and
families of individuals killed by CPD, and after reviewing CPD
policies, procedures, and training programs, the DOJ concluded
that “CPD officers’ force practices unnecessarily endanger
themselves and others and result in unnecessary and avoidable
shootings and other uses of force,” in violation of the United States
Constitution.49 Specifically, the report found that CPD officers,
contrary to CPD policy, employ tactics that place themselves and
the public in danger: shooting at vehicles, unsafely using their
vehicles, and initiating “tactically unsound and unnecessary” foot
pursuits that often conclude “with officers unreasonably shooting
someone—including unarmed individuals.”50 The DOJ report
details unnecessary, fatal interactions: CPD officers fired forty-five
rounds at an unarmed man, fatally shot an unarmed man in the
back, and shot an unarmed man lying on the ground three times in
the back, killing him.51 The DOJ found that the CPD’s use of nonlethal and lethal force violated the Fourth Amendment as well as
CPD policy.52
Discriminatory use of force is not limited to Chicago: it
plagues communities across the nation. In 2016, Roland Fryer
published a working paper detailing findings of racial disparities in
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id. at 5.
Id. at 57.
Id. at 9.
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. C.R. DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE CHICAGO POLICE
DEPARTMENT, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (Jan. 13, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/
925846/download.
49. Id. at 2, 4.
50. Id. at 5.
51. Id. at 25–26.
52. Id. at 25, 32.
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police use of force.53 Fryer’s team controlled for demographics,
including age and gender, as well as encounter characteristics such
as whether the civilian gave the officer identification, if the location
of the interaction was in a high- or low-crime area, and how the
civilian reportedly behaved.54 The study confirmed that law
enforcement is more likely to touch, push, handcuff, use pepper
spray or a baton, or draw and point their weapons at Blacks and
Hispanics than Whites.55 Controversially, the study did not find
evidence of racial bias in police shootings of civilians.56
According to Fryer, as a law enforcement officer increases the
level of force used—for example when an encounter escalates from
pushing an individual against the wall to the use of pepper spray—
the likelihood that the civilian, regardless of race, is subjected to
further increased use of force decreases.57 Despite the lower
likelihood of higher-level uses of force, Fryer found that law
enforcement officers’ use of both lethal and non-lethal force
disproportionately impacts Blacks and Hispanics.58 For example,
compared to Whites, Blacks and Hispanics are approximately 53%
more likely to have force used against them.59 Amongst all civilians,
there is a 0.26% likelihood that a law enforcement officer will draw
their weapon; however, law enforcement officers are 21.3% more
likely to draw their weapon when interacting with Blacks than
Whites.60 Upon arrest, Blacks and Hispanics are approximately 7%
more likely to be subjected to the use of force than Whites.61 The
racial difference in the use of force by law enforcement does not
change based on the civilian’s gender or the race of the officer.62
Fryer concludes that compared to Whites, Blacks and Hispanics,
have very different interactions with law enforcement—
interactions that are consistent with, though definitely not
proof of, some form of discrimination. Including myriad
controls designed to account for civilian demographics,

53. Fryer, Jr., supra note 12.
54. See id. at 3 (noting that none of the controls altered the findings of the study).
55. Id. at 4; Quoctrung Bui & Amanda Cox, Surprising New Evidence Shows Bias
in Police Use of Force but Not in Shootings, N.Y. TIMES (July 11, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/12/upshot/surprising-new-evidence-shows-bias-inpolice-use-of-force-but-not-in-shootings.html.
56. See Bui & Cox, supra note 55 (quoting Roland G. Fryer, “[i]t is the most
surprising result of my career”).
57. Fryer, Jr., supra note 12, at 4.
58. Id. at 4.
59. Id. at 4, 16.
60. Id. at 4.
61. Id. at 19.
62. Id. at 21.
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encounter characteristics, civilian behavior, eventual outcomes
of the interaction and year reduces, but cannot eliminate, racial
differences in non-lethal use of force.63

b. Evidence of the Judiciary Endorsing Police Practices of
Racial Profiling
Prior to the holdings of Strieff and its antecedents—Whren v.
United States, Devenpeck v. Alford, and Herring v. United States—
an average motorist who obeyed traffic laws and vehicle safety
requirements could rationally presume, absent a valid warrant or
their explicit consent, that police could not legally stop and search
their vehicle.64 Previously, the Supreme Court maintained that
vehicles, due to their mobility, would only be subject to a search
without a warrant so long as an officer had probable cause to believe
that there was contraband in the vehicle.65 The probable cause
standard requires that an officer have “[a] reasonable ground to
suspect that a person has committed or is committing a crime or
that a place contains specific items connected with a crime.”66
However, Strieff and its antecedents, combined with the common
practice of racial profiling, eviscerate that expectation for motorists,
disproportionately so for racial minorities.
In 1996, the Supreme Court had its first opportunity to
address law enforcement’s use of racial profiling in traffic stops
when it heard Whren v. United States.67 In Whren, plainclothes law
enforcement officers observed a vehicle occupied by two young Black
men waiting at a stop sign for more than twenty seconds.68 Officers
turned their vehicle around and began to pursue the vehicle, which
had begun to drive away at an “unreasonable” speed.69 After pulling
their squad car alongside the vehicle, one of the officers approached
the vehicle and saw two bags filled with white powder.70 Both the
driver and the passenger were arrested.71
The defendants
challenged the legality of the stop and seizure of the contraband,
63. Id.
64. See David A. Moran, The New Fourth Amendment Vehicle Doctrine: Stop and
Search Any Car at Any Time, 47 VILL. L. REV. 815, 819 (2002).
65. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153–54 (1925); see also U.S.
CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue but upon probable cause . . . .”).
66. Probable Cause, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
67. 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
68. Id. at 808, 810.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 809.
71. Id.
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arguing that the initial traffic stop was pretextual and that the
officers lacked both the probable cause and reasonable suspicion
necessary to initiate the search for drugs.72
The Court ruled that the constitutionality of a traffic stop
neither hinges on “the actual motivations of the individual officers
involved” nor the “collective consciousness of law enforcement.”73
This decision established that an individual law enforcement
officer’s subjective motivations for conducting a traffic stop, even if
admittedly pretextual, do not invalidate a stop and search, “even if
a reasonable officer” in the same situation “would not have stopped
the motorist.”74 Additionally, the Court held that future challenges
to discriminatory policing must be pursued through the Equal
Protection Clause rather than the Fourth Amendment.75 In order
for a law enforcement officer’s stop and search to survive a Fourth
Amendment challenge, the officer must simply demonstrate that
they had probable cause to initiate the stop.76
Building upon Whren, the Court, in Devenpeck v. Alford, was
asked to decide whether an officer’s arrest of an individual without
probable cause invalidates subsequent arrest-able offenses that are
not “closely related” to the initial offense.77 In November 1997, the
defendant saw a vehicle stopped on the side of the road, pulled his
car over, and began assisting the stranded driver.78 Shortly after
the defendant started helping the motorist, a law enforcement
officer arrived.79 Upon seeing the law enforcement officer, the
defendant returned to his car and drove away.80 The stranded
motorist informed the officer that they had the impression that the
defendant was a police officer.81 The law enforcement officer,
believing that the defendant was impersonating a police officer,
pulled over the defendant.82 The defendant recorded his interaction
with the officer and was arrested for the unrelated and legal act of
recording a law enforcement officer.83

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id.
Id. at 813, 815.
Id. at 806.
Id. at 813.
Id. at 818.
543 U.S. 146, 148 (2004).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 150.
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In deciding Devenpeck, the Court held that an officer’s
subjective rationale for conducting a stop “need not be the criminal
offense as to which the known facts provide probable cause.”84 The
Court, building off the holding in Whren that an officer’s subjective
intent is immaterial, articulated that the offense which establishes
probable cause does not need to be “closely related” to the violation
used to justify the arrest.85 The Court voiced its concern that
invalidating an arrest based on a law enforcement officer’s
expressed subjective rationale for arresting an individual, such as
racial bias, would arbitrarily expand individuals’ Fourth
Amendment protections and encourage officers to either cease
explaining to arrestees the reason for their arrest or officers would
feel pressured to list every possible reason for an arrest.86
Ultimately, the Court validated an arrest for a non-existent
offense.87 Combined, Whren and Devenpeck effectively shield law
enforcement officers’ racially-motivated, pretextual reasons for
arrest from judicial scrutiny even if the underlying basis for the stop
and search was improper.88
The Court’s permissive attitude toward law enforcement’s
practice of racial profiling is further weaponized in Herring v.
United States. In Herring, the Court was asked to determine
whether an individual who was arrested pursuant to a law
enforcement officer’s inaccurate belief that there was an active
arrest warrant suffered a constitutional violation.89 When law
enforcement officers learned that Mr. Herring was retrieving an
item from his impounded vehicle, they investigated whether he had
any active warrants.90 After learning there was an outstanding
warrant for Mr. Herring, officers arrested him and found that he
was in possession of methamphetamine and a firearm.91 However,
the warrant that facilitated the arrest had been recalled months
earlier but, due to a clerical error, still appeared in the database.92
Mr. Herring challenged the legality of the stop and search and

84. Id. at 153–54.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 154–55.
87. Brian J. Foley, Policing from the Gut: Anti-Intellectualism in American
Criminal Procedure, 69 MD. L. REV. 261, 319 (2010).
88. Id.
89. Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 136–37 (2009).
90. Id. at 137.
91. Id. (noting that Herring, as a felon, could not possess a firearm).
92. Id. at 137–38.
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asked that the Court apply the exclusionary rule to the unlawfully
seized evidence.93
The Court accepted the factual finding that the clerk who
failed to maintain accurate records did not do so deliberately and
held that the exclusionary rule would not apply to the evidence
obtained in the search of Mr. Herring.94 The Court stated that the
mere violation of a constitutional right does not automatically make
a stop and search unreasonable and expanded the breadth of the
ruling by holding that a probable cause determination based on
false information does not necessitate the application of the
exclusionary rule.95
The Court’s decision to withhold the
exclusionary rule in cases of clear error denies defendants an
important remedy when their Fourth Amendment rights have been
violated.96
Most recently, in Utah v. Strieff, the Court was asked to
determine whether incriminating evidence obtained pursuant to a
law enforcement officer’s unconstitutional stop and search of an
individual, which resulted in the discovery of a valid arrest warrant,
was admissible.97 In 2006, a law enforcement officer saw Mr. Strieff
leave a suspected narcotics house.98 The officer followed Mr. Strieff
and requested he produce his identification, which, when ran,
turned up an active arrest warrant for a minor traffic violation.99
Accordingly, the officer searched Mr. Strieff, discovered drug
paraphernalia and methamphetamine, and arrested him.100
Despite finding that the officer may have acted negligently and
did not have probable cause to stop Mr. Strieff, the Court validated
the admission of the evidence discovered after the illegal stop
because, the Court rationalized, nothing legally precluded the
officer from approaching the suspect and the officer’s actions were
not indicative of systemic violations of individuals’ Fourth
Amendment rights.101 As pertains to the exclusionary rule, the
Court found that evidence discovered pursuant to an unlawful stop
is admissible if an officer discovers an active warrant after the
illegal stop.102 Ultimately, the Court’s decision overlooks illegal law
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id. at 138.
Id. at 146.
Id. at 141.
Id. at 152–53 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
136 S. Ct. 2056, 2059 (2016).
Id. at 2060.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2063.
Id.
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enforcement stops so long as the illegal stop results in the discovery
of an outstanding warrant for even very minor offenses.103
II. Whren, Devenpeck, Herring, and Strieff: The Gutting of
Fourth Amendment Protections
In the early twentieth century, the Supreme Court restricted
the right of law enforcement officers to initiate a search incident to
arrest.104 The Court required that the search be limited to the
accused individual, the premises subject to their physical control,
and that the object sought be either a weapon or object used to
commit a crime.105 The Court’s holdings in Strieff and its
antecedents undercut these restrictions and validate racially
motivated, pretextual stops that lack probable cause and are found
to have been unwarranted ex post facto.
In Whren, the Court held that a law enforcement officer’s
pretextual, racially motivated stop does not constitute a Fourth
Amendment violation.106 The Court’s ruling allows the subjective,
racially discriminatory motivations of law enforcement officers to be
scrubbed from the factual record, ultimately sanitizing offensive
facts from judicial review. The Court, by ignoring racially
motivated police actions, endorses a panoply of blatantly pretextual,
racial profiling tactics.107 In practice, these rulings enabled an
increase in pretextual, racially motivated stops.108 The Whren
Court further damaged the ability of arrestees to combat improper
stops when it redirected legal challenges to racially motivated police
actions to the Equal Protection Clause rather than the Fourth
Amendment.109 By relegating future legal actions to the Equal
Protection Clause, the Court requires defendants to provide
103. Id. at 2064 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
104. P. A. Agabin, Annotation, Lawfulness of Search of Motor Vehicle Following
Arrest for Traffic Violation, 10 A.L.R.3d Art. 1 (2017).
105. Id.
106. See Gabriel J. Chin & Charles J. Vernon, Reasonable but Unconstitutional:
Racial Profiling and the Radical Objectivity of Whren v. United States, 83 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 882, 884 (2015).
107. See id. at 884–85. See generally Brooks Holland, Racial Profiling and a
Punitive Exclusionary Rule, 20 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 29 (2010) (arguing
that the Court has too narrowly prohibited the subjection of racial profiling to
constitutional scrutiny).
108. See David A. Harris, Addressing Racial Profiling in the States: A Case Study
of the “New Federalism” in Constitutional and Criminal Procedure, 3 U. PA. J. CONST.
L. 367, 384 (2010).
109. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996); see also Chin &
Vernon, supra note 106, at 919 (noting that despite the unconstitutionality of
discriminatory conduct, discriminatory law enforcement actions often survive the
Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness test).
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evidence of a facially discriminatory law or policy, or a facially
neutral law or policy that was passed due to explicit racial animus;
contrastingly, Fourth Amendment challenges only require evidence
that the stop and search was unreasonable.110
In Devenpeck, the Court ruled that an officer’s subjective
reason for initiating a stop, so long as it satisfies the low threshold
of probable cause, does not need to be “closely related” to the offense
that the officer ultimately stops the suspect for.111 When combined
with Whren, Devenpeck permits law enforcement officers, to stop an
individual for pretextual, racially motivated reasons and conduct an
arrest for an offense completely unrelated to the supposed offense
that established sufficient probable cause to validate the stop.112
For example, an officer seeing a Black driver can stop that
individual despite the individual not having visibly broken any
laws. If the officer discovers that the individual is in violation of a
law, for example by not wearing a seatbelt or driving with a revoked
driver’s license, the officer may arrest the individual, even if the stop
was founded on racist beliefs.
In Herring, the Court held that negligent record keeping that
results in an otherwise illegal arrest does not necessarily render
evidence inadmissible.113 In Strieff, the Court ruled that evidence
obtained pursuant to an unconstitutional stop is admissible so long
as the officer discovers that the individual has an active warrant.114
Justice Sotomayor’s dissent in Strieff outlines the dangerously
expansive implications of the majority opinion:
This case allows the police to stop you on the street, demand
your identification, and check it for outstanding traffic
warrants—even if you are doing nothing wrong. If the officer
discovers a warrant for a fine you forgot to pay, courts will now
excuse his illegal stop and will admit into evidence anything he
happens to find by searching you after arresting you on the

110. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (“Disproportionate impact
is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination
forbidden by the Constitution. Standing alone, it does not trigger the rule . . . that
racial classifications are to be subjected to the strictest scrutiny . . . .”) (citations
omitted); see also Chin & Vernon, supra note 106, at 884–886 (“Although Whren
recognized that another provision of the Constitution, the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibited racial discrimination, the Court did not
mention that successful claims of selective enforcement are vanishingly small.”).
111. See 543 U.S. 146, 153 (2004).
112. See id.; Whren, 517 U.S. at 806.
113. See Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 147–48 (2009) (“We do not
suggest that all recordkeeping errors by the police are immune from the exclusionary
rule.”).
114. See 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2059 (2016).
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warrant.115

The aggregate effect of Strieff and its antecedents is the
judicial validation of racially motivated stops that lack the requisite
probable cause, so long as the individual being stopped is
retroactively found to have an active warrant, even if the warrant
is no longer active, but still in the system due to administrative
negligence.116
III. The Cumulative Impact of Strieff and its Antecedents
on Racial Minorities’ Likelihood of Low-Level
Harassment by Law Enforcement
In 2014, forty states reported that they maintained warrant
files within a statewide database.117 Among those forty states,
there are more than 7,800,000 active warrants.118 Of those
warrants, approximately 725,000 are felony level, almost 3,900,000
are misdemeanor warrants, and nearly 860,000 are for “other”
offenses.119 In light of Strieff and its antecedents, the prevalence of
active warrants is cause for concern for all individuals walking or
driving the streets of the United States.120 The astronomical
number of active warrants means that millions of individuals,
particularly racial minorities, are at risk of being stopped for
pretextual reasons and searched incident to the existence of a

115. Id. at 2064 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
116. Compare id. at 2059 (holding that evidence discovered pursuant to an
unlawful stop is admissible if an officer discovers an active warrant after the illegal
arrest), with Devenpeck, 543 U.S. 146 (holding that an officer’s subjective reason for
initiating a stop does not need to be “closely related” to the offense for which the
officer ultimately arrests the suspect), Herring, 555 U.S. 135 (holding that negligent
recordkeeping that results in an otherwise illegal arrest does not necessarily render
illegally obtained evidence inadmissible), and Whren, 517 U.S. 806 (holding that a
law enforcement officer’s pretextual, racially motivated stop does not constitute a
Fourth Amendment violation); see also Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318,
340 (2009) (“We simply cannot conclude that the Fourth Amendment, as originally
understood, forbade peace officers to arrest without a warrant for misdemeanors not
amounting to or involving breach of the peace.”).
117. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, SURVEY OF STATE
CRIMINAL HISTORY INFORMATION SYSTEMS tbl.5, https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bjs/
grants/249799.pdf (Dec. 2015) (excluding Arkansas, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi,
New Jersey, New Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and Tennessee).
118. Id. at 4.
119. Id. at tbl.5a (noting that several states, though reporting that they maintain
a warrant database, did not provide data on the number of “felony,” “misdemeanor,”
and “other” warrants within their state).
120. See Oren Bar-Gill & Barry Friedman, Taking Warrants Seriously, 106 NW.
U. L. REV. 1609, 1664 (2012) (“[I]n light of police secrecy and defects in recordkeeping,
data on searches and warrants is scarce.”).
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warrant, even if the warrant is for a low-level offense or has been
withdrawn.
The majority of active arrest warrants are for low-level
offenses, such as unpaid fines or misdemeanor offenses—offenses
which disproportionately impact racial minorities, suggesting that
the negative effects of Strieff and its antecedents will be more potent
in Black and Hispanic communities than in White communities.121
Because some law enforcement officers believe that targeting racial
minorities is a good and effective practice, these decisions will
aggressively mutate racial profiling from an ineffective practice into
a technique that law enforcement officers can employ to overcriminalize Black and Hispanic communities.122 Strieff and its
antecedents’ legal accommodation for racial profiling, when grafted
onto the abundance of readily available criminal offenses123 and the
devastating number of outstanding warrants, transforms the
United States into a chilling landscape: law enforcement officers
can stop an individual for pretextual reasons and retroactively
validate the discriminatory action by arresting the individual for an
unrelated offense or by discovering an apparently active arrest
warrant.124 These rulings allow law enforcement officers to
(continue to) focus their efforts on racial minorities,125 target
specific neighborhoods, and incarcerate racial minorities at rates
that exceed their percentage of both the general and crimecommitting populations.126 Combined, these cases embolden the
121. See Ann Cammett, Shadow Citizens: Felony Disenfranchisement and the
Criminalization of Debt, 117 PENN ST. L. REV. 349, 381 (2012) (“[D]ebtor’s prison has
persisted in other ways and, like mass incarceration, is based on race and class
status.”).
122. See Dunn, supra note 18, at 990; Meehan & Ponder, supra note 27, at 418.
123. See Jonathan Blanks, America’s Stupidest Criminal Laws, WASH. POST (June
25, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2014/06/25/americas
-stupidest-criminal-justice-laws/?utm_term=.da5ccafbfd2e (“Throwing the book at
offenders with well-meant but misguided lawmaking has wreaked havoc on
correctional budgets while breaking up families and damaging local economies in the
process.”).
124. See Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056 (2016); Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146
(2004); Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
125. See, e.g., Andrew Gelman, Jeffrey Fagan & Alex Kiss, An Analysis of the New
York City Police Department’s “Stop-and-Frisk” Policy in the Context of Claims of
Racial Bias, 102 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N 813, 821–22 (2007) (discussing the results of an
analysis of New York’s “Stop-and-Frisk” policy, researchers found that, “the NYPD’s
records indicate that they were stopping [B]lacks and Hispanics more often than
[W]hites, in comparison to both the populations of these groups and the best
estimates of the rate of crimes committed by each group. . . . A related piece of
evidence is that stops of [B]lacks and Hispanics were less likely than those of
[W]hites to lead to arrest, suggesting that the standards were more relaxed for
stopping minority group members.”).
126. See Foley, supra note 87, at 340–341.
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use of racial profiling and bar victims of these practice from utilizing
the Fourth Amendment to protect themselves from these
reprehensible violations of their constitutional rights.
IV. A Perverse Incentive With a Negative Impact
The rulings of Strieff and its antecedents perversely
incentivize the expansion of racial profiling by law enforcement
officers. The rulings fail to prohibit racially motivated stops and
permit law enforcement officers to retroactively justify illegal stops
by either finding another reason to initiate an arrest or by
discovering an arrest warrant.127 These cases add racial profiling
to law enforcement officers’ toolboxes, restrict and endanger the
physical liberties and physical safety of racial minorities, and
disassemble the constitutional barriers to discriminatory
policing.128 To weed out the widespread practice of racial profiling,
a two-pronged approach must be adopted: (a) the Supreme Court
must overturn Strieff and its antecedents and take accountability
for its complicity in the practice of racial profiling; (b) because
judicial rulings provide legal cover for—but are not the genesis of—
racial profiling, law enforcement precincts and academies must
actively combat racially motivated practices by utilizing
recruitment and training programs that acknowledge and confront
racial profiling.
a. Prong 1: Overturn Strieff and its Antecedents and End
the Era of Judicial Complicity in Racial Profiling
Roland Fryer’s empirical study of police use of force examined
multiple data sets from across the United States to determine
whether different racial groups are disparately subjected to police
use of lethal and non-lethal force.129 One of the programs Fryer
examined was New York City’s Stop, Question, and Frisk Program
(“Stop and Frisk”).130 Through the Stop and Frisk Program,131 law
127. Compare Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2059 (holding that evidence discovered
pursuant to an unlawful stop is admissible if an officer discovers an active warrant
after the illegal stop), with Devenpeck, 543 U.S. at 146 (holding that an officer’s
subjective reason for initiating a stop does not need to be “closely related” to the
offense for which the officer ultimately arrests the suspect), and Whren, 517 U.S. at
806 (holding that a law enforcement officer’s pretextual, racially motivated stop does
not constitute a Fourth Amendment violation).
128. See Winbush, supra note 32 (detailing how to mount a Fourth Amendment
challenge to racial profiling).
129. See Fryer, Jr., supra note 12, at 2–6.
130. Id. at 2.
131. See RUN THE JEWELS, Early, on RUN THE JEWELS 2 (Mass Appeal) (2014)
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enforcement officers could stop an individual, question them, and
search, or frisk, that person for weapons or illicit items.132 Fryer’s
team examined approximately five million instances of police
interactions with individuals through Stop and Frisk.133 Stop and
Frisk is relevant to this Article because it mirrors the results of
Strieff and its antecedents in that neither requires law enforcement
officers to have probable cause prior to initiating a stop.134
Moreover, under both, once a stop has been initiated, law
enforcement officers have a plethora of options to retroactively
validate an otherwise illegal stop and search.135
Fryer’s analysis of Stop and Frisk sheds valuable insight into
the possible repercussions of the Supreme Court’s holdings in
Strieff and its antecedents. After controlling for a number of
variables,136 which, did notably “little to alter the results,”137 the
study found that Blacks, who comprised 58% of all stops, were the
most likely to be stopped, followed by Hispanics, who experienced
25% of stops, and Whites, who represented a paltry 10% of all
stops.138 If these numbers reflected a policy of randomly stopping
individuals on the street, Blacks would proportionally comprise
25.5% of stops—less than half the rate revealed by the study.139
(hinting at the use of retroactive justification and explaining the experience of being
subjected Stop and Frisk tactics as well as the personal repercussions, Killer Mike
raps, “[c]ould it be that my medicine’s the evidence, for pigs to stop and ask me when
they rollin’ round on patrol? And ask why you’re here? I just tell ‘em cause it is what
it is, I live here and that’s what it is . . . . Please don’t lock me up in front of my kids
and in front of my wife, man, I ain’t got a gun or a knife. You do this and you ruin
my life.”).
132. Fryer, Jr., supra note 12, at 2.
133. Id.
134. Sheree Davis & Marie Fitzgerald, Stop and Frisk, 23 HOW. L.J. 155, 155
(1980) (noting that in Terry v. Ohio, the Supreme Court required only that an officer
have “reasonable suspicion” that a stopped individual was involved in a crime and
was armed and dangerous).
135. Compare Utah v. Strieff, 36 S. Ct. 2056, 2059 (2016) (holding that evidence
discovered pursuant to an unlawful stop is admissible if an officer discovers an active
warrant after the illegal stop), with Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153 (2004)
(holding that an officer’s subjective reason for initiating a stop does not need to be
“closely related” to the offense for which the officer ultimately arrests the suspect),
and Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 806 (1996) (holding that a law
enforcement officer’s pretextual, racially motivated stop does not constitute a Fourth
Amendment violation).
136. Fryer, Jr., supra note 12, at 49 tbl.3 (“We control for gender, a quadratic in
age, civilian behavior, whether the stop was indoors or outdoors, whether the stop
took place during the daytime, whether the stop took place in a high crime area or
during a high crime time, whether the officer was in uniform, civilian ID type,
whether others were stopped during the interaction, and missings in all variables.”).
137. Id. at 4.
138. Id. at 39–40 tbl.1A.
139. Id. at 9.
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Equally concerning are Fyer’s findings regarding the use of
non-lethal force against racial minorities through Stop and Frisk.
During the Stop and Frisk program, after controlling for civilian
behavior, Blacks and Hispanics were nearly 53% more likely to have
force used against them compared to Whites.140 While the use of
high-level force—such as the use of a baton or pepper spray—is less
likely than low-level uses of force—such as an officer placing their
hands on an individual or pushing them into a wall—high-level uses
of force were more likely to be used against Blacks than Whites.141
After examining “perfectly compliant individuals and control[ling]
for civilian, officer, encounter and location variables, [B]lack
civilians are 21.1[%] more likely to have any force used against
them compared to [W]hite civilians with the same reported
compliance behavior.”142
In 2013, the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York held that New York’s Stop and Frisk was
racially discriminatory.143 The court’s decision relied on evidence
that the New York City Police Department (NYPD) stopped Blacks
and Hispanics at higher rates than Whites, that the stops occurred
in certain pockets of the city, that disproportionate amounts of force
were used by law enforcement against Blacks and Hispanics
compared to Whites, and that the stops of Blacks and Hispanics
were initiated with less legal justification than the stops of
Whites.144 The court also acknowledged the failure of courts to
combat racial profiling, stating “courts should ‘not condone racially
motivated police behavior’ and must ‘take seriously an allegation of
racial profiling.’”145 Unfortunately, neither the district court’s
holding nor its admonishment motivated the Supreme Court to
introspectively examine its role in furthering racial profiling and
the impacts of its holdings on racial minorities when it ruled in
Strieff.146

140. Id. at 16.
141. Id. at 18.
142. Id. at 31.
143. See Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
144. Joseph Ferrandino, Minority Threat Hypothesis and NYPD Stop and Frisk
Policy, 40 CRIM. JUST. REV. 209, 211 (2014).
145. Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 660 (citing United States v. Davis, 11 F. App’x 16,
18 (2d Cir. 2001)).
146. See Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2068 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting)
(“Most striking about the Court’s opinion is its insistence that the event here was
‘isolated,’ with ‘no indication that this unlawful stop was part of any systemic or
recurrent police misconduct.’ Respectfully, nothing about this case is isolated.”)
(citations omitted).
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The documented racial disparities in the use of force stemming
from Stop and Frisk and the similarities between Stop and Frisk
and Strieff and its antecedents substantiates concerns that the
Court’s recent rulings may increase law enforcement officers’
propensity to harass racial minorities. Moreover, the potential for
low-level harassment to escalate to non-lethal force and lethal force
demands that the Court follow Justice Sotomayor’s dissent, heed
the lower court’s warning, and rigorously re-examine Strieff and its
antecedents.147
b. Prong 2: All Levels of Law Enforcement Must Proactively
Counter Their Role in Perpetuating Racial Profiling
In light of Donald Trump’s statements during his 2016
presidential campaign endorsing New York City’s unconstitutional
Stop and Frisk program148 and his administration’s commitment to
restore “law and order,”149 it is unlikely that the current Executive
branch will act to correct the damaging practices and outcomes
stemming from the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence.150 Without federal encouragement and guidance in
changing the nationwide equivalent of Stop and Frisk, and the
improbability of the judiciary overturning Strieff and its
antecedents, individual law enforcement precincts should take the
initiative to combat racial profiling and the subsequent use of
force.151

147. See The Weeds: Basic Income and Police Shootings, VOX (July 15, 2016)
(noting Ezra Klein’s assertion that “if you’ve been stopped 52 times [referencing
Philando Castile], often for not very much reason at all, that’s 52 opportunities for
something to go wrong . . . . [I]t may be the case that on a given stop police are not
more likely to shoot you if you’re African-American. But, if it is the case that police
have X% chance of shooting anyone and they’re stopping African-Americans twenty
times more, then we would expect a much higher rate of African-Americans being
shot by the police. And Fryer’s data doesn’t contradict that, it is within that . . . .”)
(quote begins at 41:56).
148. See Jim Dwyer, What Donald Trump Got Wrong on Stop-and-Frisk, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 27, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/28/nyregion/what-donaldtrump-got-wrong-on-stop-and-frisk.html.
149. See STANDING UP FOR OUR LAW ENFORCEMENT COMMUNITY,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/law-enforcement-community (last visited Nov. 14,
2017).
150. See id. Contra Harry Bruinius, Obama, in Surprise Move, Wades Into NYPD
‘Stop and Frisk’ Lawsuit, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (June 13, 2013),
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2013/0613/Obama-in-surprise-move-wadesinto-NYPD-stop-and-frisk-lawsuit (“The New York Police Department’s
controversial ‘stop and frisk’ policy received a kick in the shins this week, when the
Obama administration took the unusual step of outlining its preferred remedy in the
event a federal judge examining the NYPD tactic rules it to be unconstitutional.”).
151. See Radley Balko, Jeff Sessions Dismisses DOJ Reports on Police Abuse
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Strieff and its antecedents, when taken to their natural end,
will increase police brutality which will further damage
relationships between law enforcement and Black and Hispanic
communities.152 One way precincts can combat racial profiling is to
require that law enforcement academies provide more
comprehensive training to recruits. Outside of field training, law
enforcement recruits complete approximately 840 hours of
training.153 Approximately 96% of training academies utilize a
classroom structure for basic training.154 Between 2006 and 2013,
the number of academies that included training on community
policing increased from 92% to 97% percent.155 However, on
average, academies only required trainees to complete 43 hours of
community policing training, of which only 12 hours were dedicated
to cultural diversity and human relations.156 Despite an abundance
of data exposing the prevalence and inefficiency of racial profiling,
law enforcement academies spend an inadequate amount of time
teaching recruits about how to professionally interact with racial
minorities. Without proper training, it is possible that law
enforcement officers will be guided by racial animus, instead of best
practice, in deciding who to stop, when to search, and what level of
force to exact upon racial minorities.
Data concerning the average training requirements for deescalation tactics was lumped into the broad category of “use of
force” requirements, which, in total, averaged a meager 21 hours.157
Precincts ought to demand that academies increase the number of
hours of training concerning de-escalation techniques in order to
Without Bothering to Read Them, WASH. POST (Feb. 28, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2017/02/28/jeff-sessionsdismisses-doj-reports-on-police-abuse-without-bothering-to-read-them/?utm_term=
.3a34464d06f7 (quoting Attorney General Jeff Sessions, who commented on the
Chicago and Ferguson Justice Department reports, stating that “[s]ome of it was
pretty anecdotal and not so scientifically based,” and explaining that Sessions’
statement came amidst reports that Sessions is undecided on whether or not the
Department of Justice will implement reforms to the Chicago and Ferguson Police
Departments).
152. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CMTY. RELS. SERV., COMMUNITY RELATIONS
SERVICES TOOLKIT FOR POLICING, IMPORTANCE OF POLICE-COMMUNITY
RELATIONSHIPS AND RESOURCES FOR FURTHER READING, https://www.justice.gov/crs/
file/836486/download (last accessed Nov. 14, 2017) (emphasizing the importance of
law enforcement relationships with communities they interact with).
153. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., OFF. OF JUST. PROGRAMS, STATE AND LOCAL LAW
ENFORCEMENT TRAINING ACADEMIES, 2013 (July 2016) at 4, https://www.bjs.gov/
content/pub/pdf/slleta13.pdf.
154. Id. at 3.
155. Id. at 7.
156. Id. at 7 tbl.8.
157. Id. at 5.
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reduce unnecessary escalation, which predominantly impacts racial
minorities. As evidenced in the case of Philando Castile and noted
in the DOJ report on its investigation of the Chicago Police
Department, racially imbalanced, lethal escalation is ingrained in
everyday policing and has fatal consequences—it is the duty of
academies and precincts to proactively counter this practice by
comprehensively educating law enforcement officers on deescalation techniques as well as teaching officers how to avoid
escalation in the first case.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court’s decisions in Strieff and its antecedents
concurrently expand legal protections for law enforcement officers’
discriminatory actions while gutting constitutional protections for
individuals. The effects of these decisions, when mapped onto the
widespread use of racial profiling by law enforcement, legalize law
enforcement officers’ rampant practice of exploiting racial biases to
stop and search racial minorities without probable cause. Over
time, this practice will further transform racial profiling into a selffulfilling prophecy: law enforcement officers will monitor and overcriminalize the otherwise legal activities of racial minorities.
Combined, these cases will increase law enforcement officer’s lowlevel, and potentially high-level, harassment of racial minorities,
resulting in an increase in law enforcement officers’ use of nonlethal and potentially-lethal force against racial minorities. To
combat this, a two-prong approach is necessary: First, the Supreme
Court must endorse Justice Sotomayor’s dissent in Strieff and
overturn its rulings in Strieff and its antecedents. Second, law
enforcement precincts and training academies should increase
recruits’ required training on community policing and de-escalation
techniques.

